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Social crises in the United States are discussed
generally, as either social problems or social conflicts.
Viewed as social problems, high levels of unemployment, under
employment, inflation, the absence or inadequacy of public
social services are attributed to structural or functional
maladies in government, or weaknesses in the private corpo
rate sector. The prescriptive remedies in both cases suggest,
generally, more public sector interventions, either in the
forms of greater or lesser public expenditures, or more or
less government fiscal and monetary controls.’
However, social deficiencies, viewed as social
1Theodore Caplow, “Toward Social Hope: The Coming of
the Era of Protest,” in Is America Possible? Social Problems
from Conservative Liberal and Socialist Perspectives, edited
by Henry Etzbowitz (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1974),
pp. 28—34. See also, Herbert Blumer, “Social Problems as
Collective Behavior,” Ibid., pp. 35—41; Winston Moore,
Charles Livermore, and George Galland, Jr., “Woodlawn the
Zone of Destruction,” Ibid., pp. 48-59; Francis Fox Piven,
“The Great Society as Political Strategy,” Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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conflicts, have no permanent resolution in reformation
policies. Social conflicts are considered political in na
ture, resulting from class antagonisms between dominant and
subordinant class interests. These conflicts are resolved
by the ability of one group to subordinate the interests of
the other group.2
Despite these divergent view points, there seems to
be consensus in terms of the direction in which the United
States public and private sectors are moving towards the
amelioration of the current and potentially explosive social
crises. The U. S. post-industrial society is being viewed
as a society that needs to be managed and in order to achieve
this it is necessary to formulate a greater symbiotic rela
tionship between the public and the private corporate sectors.
The current social difficulties in the United States is being
viewed as a fiscal crisis, a consequence emanating from the
structural gap between state expenditures and revenues. The
managed society proposition proposes to address this dilemma
through the use of greater amounts of public funds, managed
2James Rule, “The Problem with Social Problems, Is
America Possible?, pp. 21—27; Richard Sennett, “The Uses of
Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life,” Ibid., pp. 66-75.
Also see, Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, The Dynamics of U.S.
Capitalism: Corporate Structure, Inflation, Credit, Gold and
Dollar (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 23.
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by the private corporate sector. Additionally it proposes
new structural governmental arrangements at all levels of
government.3 These are needed, it is being said, for effi
ciency and economy purposes. This new reformist effort is
being commonly referred to as regional planning and develop
ment, or regionalism. The ultimate objective of regionalism
is the creation of regional governments, which suggest the
consolidation of multi—state units and substate units. It
is the contention of the regional reformists that these new
structures will allow for more political, economic, and ad
ministrative efficiency and effectiveness in redressing the
current pressing fiscal and general socio—economic crises in
the U.S.
In the broad sense this study is concerned with
social crises in the U.S. and those reformation policies and
3For a discussion of current, public/private reforma
tion policy in the U.S., from a Marxian perspective, see
James O’Connor’s The Fiscal Crises of the State (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1973), especially chapters 2 and 9; and
Bertram CrossT essay, “Friendly Fascism: A Model for America,”
in Is America Possible? From the reformative perspective,
see Congressman Henry S. Reuss’ work, Revenue Sharing: Crutch
or Catalyst for State and Local Government (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), Chapters 1—111; and the Advisory Commis
sion on Intergovernmental Relations (Washington, D.C.: Govern
ment Printing Office), and their publications on government
reorganization, 1961 through 1970.
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programs which are being advocated and implemented to address
these. The emphasis herein is with regionalism, viewed as a
reformation policy. The regional model appears to hold the
greatest currency at the present time. To understand the
broad ramifications of regionalism, the author has elected
to focus the study on regional planning and development dis
tricts in the state of Georgia, officially referred to as
the Area Planning and Development Commissions (.PDCs)
Another reason for the specific focus on regionalism
at a substate level is because it is here that regionalism
has its greatest visibility. Georgia is selected because it
has the most elaborate of the state systems of multi—county
organizations, where eighteen area planning and development
commissions embrace all 159 of its counties. The state of
Georgia was a forerunner in the area of substate regionalism,
and in a sense was a logical place for multi—jurisdictional
regionalism to achieve its greatest momentum. The Georgia
counties are among the smallest, both in area and in popula
tion in the country. As this state’s leadership became in
creasingly concerned, in the 1950’s, with population decline,
economic stagnation, erosion of local tax bases being experi
enced throughout the state, except for metropolitan Atlanta
and a few other urban centers, they were agreed that revival
5
could not be organized on a county by county basis, with
every county in competition with each other. Beginning in
1957, representatives of the Georgia Power Company, the Uni
versity of Georgia, the Georgia General Assembly, and other
statewide organizations began to promote the concept of
regionalization, and two years later the multi—jurisdictional
organization was created.4
This study will attempt to delineate the structural
and functional characteristics of the Georgia APOC model7 to
project their potential viability and survivability as a ref
ormation program, purporting to ameliorate the broad social
concerns of state and local governmentT and to portray this
effort within the context of a highly sophisticated and
technically modern industrial society grappling with these
same concerns at the national level.
Chapter II discusses the effects of industrial mod
ernization on the U. S. society as a whole——the inability of
state and local governments to adjust to these consequences—-
and the need for federal intervention for the maintenance of
a degree of societal order.
4James L. Sunquist, Making Federalism Work: A Study
of Program Coordination at the Community Level (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1969), pp. 158—59.
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Chapter iii presents the history of regionalism in
the United States. This background is offered to show
the
inter—relatedness and interdependencieS of national, state,
and substate regionalism.
Chapter IV presents the legislative history of the
Georgia A.PDC’s and describes their general functional char—
act eristicS.
Chapter V selects three of the APDC’s, describes
their specific functional properties and delineates their
differences for the purpose of categorization of all eighteen
APDC’ 5.
Chapter VI attempts to predict a future for the
Georgia APIC’s, and regionalism in general, deduced from
the
general authority given them by the Georgia General Assembly
and the local governmental units from the increased
review
authority and financial support given them by the federal
government; from what is perceived as a natural evolutionary
process for an advanced industrial society; from predictions
made by a number of authors writing on the subject of region—
alism; and finally, from the author’s own observations.
Chapter VII will serve as the concluding summary of
the preceding chapters and the author’s summary remarks
on
regionalism and social reformation in general.
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Before proceeding it may be useful to define several
terms used in this study, for their usage may have meanings
unique only within the context of this study. These will be
presented as follows:
Government Consolidation: at least two units of
government joining together legally to create a new
governmental structure.
Regionalism: at least three or more units of
government, at the state or substate levels, joining
together legally for the planning and coordination of
socio—economic development in a specified geographic
area.
Substate Planning and Development Commissions:
creations of state and local governments for the
purpose of planning and coordinating socio—economic
development in a specified substate area.
Multi-State Planning and Development Commissions:
a number of states joining together for the purpose
of planning and coordinating socio—economic develop
ment in a specified multi-state area.
Interlocal: refers to matters concerning two or
more local governmental units.
Quasi—governmental: an agency with local elected
8
officials’ participation, with state and local gov
ernment legislatively mandated authority but lacking
the normal powers of government——legislative——execu
tive——judicial.
Finally, the data utilized in this study were col—
lected from staff interviews and visits to eight of the
APDC’s (see Appendix A) ; from the APDC’s literature; and




As most economic histories will indicate, rapid
change has been a characteristic of life in the United States,
but no period surpassed the last third of the nineteenth
century in this respect. A newly industrializing nation with
about thirty-five million in population became an industrial
and economic giant in the international arena with a popula
tion of about seventy-five million by the turn of the century.
A society of smaller owner—operated workshops and factories,
dependent on the skilled artisan, evolved into a system of
mass production, utilizing large numbers of unskilled
laborers and dominated by huge trusts under the control of
finance capitalists. Political affairs of both the states
and the federal governments were largely in the hands of the
business leaders. Private enterprise was permitted virtually
free play and the phenomenal economic growth process advanced
despite its accompanying violence between labor and capital.
Economic prosperity and affluence seemed to have precipitated
9
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large city slums and extreme poverty.1
Early efforts at societal infrastructural changes
suggested minimum reformation, encouraging more the formula—
2
tion of appropriate relationship between labor and capital.
The capitalists were prevailed upon to pursue these relation
ships out of a sense of benevolence, but insignificant re
suits were achieved from these efforts. Social difficulties
mounted in the urban areas and the bottom fell through with
the advent of the Great Depression.
The decade of the 1930’s brought more drastic changes
to the intergovernmental financial structure in the United
States than the entire preceeding 140 years. The primary
force behind these changes was the Depression, which was with
out historical precedence in intensity and duration. A power
ful shift in social philosophy developed when it became clear
that the state and local governments could not cope with
necessary relief and welfare needs. Local governments simply
ran out of money, as property tax collections declined and
tax collection delinquencies rose, and as they found
1Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial De
mocracy, 1865—1965 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1970), pp. 29—30.
2lbid., chapters 2, 3, and 4.
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themselves unable to borrow. State governments made an
effort to rescue the dilemma but these were laggard and cer
tainly insufficient. The chief causes of this dilemma was
attributed to a general break down in the market economy,
“laissez faire capitalism” and the structural dysfunctional
nature of local government. The United States, as a social
system, was transforming itself into a highly industrial
society and neither the private nor the public sectors were
able to perceive the need for new societal infrastructural
arrangements to cope with this transformation.
Authors and academicians like Lane W. Lancaster,
Clyde F. Snider, Melvin Clyde Hughes, and Donald G. Bishop,
writing in the 1930’s and 1940’s viewed the societal break
down in terms of the inappropriate nature of local govern
ment in general and their inability to function in behalf of
a society whose economic order had shifted from primarily
agrarian to an industrialized one. They proposed resolutions
that advocated local government consolidations and greater
federal public sector intervention in supervising and financ
ing the required governmental infrastructural arrangement.
They also recognized the basic weaknesses of the economic
system and implied a need for orderly growth as well as the
need for some federal interventions in the managing of the
12
economic system.3
The Committee for Economic Development, writing on
the same subject, reaches similar conclusions:
American institutions of local government are an
increasing strain. Well designed, by and large, to
meet the simpler needs of earlier times, they are poorly
suited to cope with new burdens imposed on all govern
ments by the complex conditions of modern life. Adap
tation to change has been slow, so limited, and so re
luctant that the future role——even the continued via
bility——of these institutions is now in grave doubt.4
In a 1967 study the Committee for Economic Develop
ment writes again:
For many years, however, states and local units of
governments have not been as effective as they should.
States and local governments are for the most part
poorly equipped to cope with the problems of the last
third of the twentieth century. In many cases they
are trying to serve an urban society with a system
developed for an agrarian society. Since 1930 demands
for improved public services have accelerated beyond
the apparent capacity and will of the state and local
governments to provide them effectively.5
3See Lane W. Lancaster, Government in Rural America
(New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1937), especially chapter 15;
Clyde F. Snider, Local Government in Rural America (New York:
Appleton Century-Craft, Inc., 1957), chapter 20; Melvin Clyde
Hughes, County Government in Georgia (Athens, Ga.: University
of Georgia Press, 1944), p. 167; Donald G. Bishop, The Struc
ture of Local Government (Menasha, Wisc.: George Banta Pub
lishing Co., 1945)
4Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing
Local Government (New York: The Committee, 1966), p. 8.
5Committee for Economic Development, A Fiscal Program
for Balanced Federalism (New York: The Committee, 1967), p. 9;
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The magnitude of the economic and social crisis of
the Great Depression era, along with the inability of state
and local governments to address this situation, forced the
intervention of the federal government. At first this new
federal role took on the form of emergency programs of public
works, work relief, and direct relief. Then in 1935 it took
a more formal character and gave expression as to the perma
nency of its newly acquired role. The 1935 Social Security
Act provided a federal program of old—age insurance, a
federal—state system of unemployment insurance, and an exten
sive system of grants for public assistance which pushed
state and local governments into these programs and reim
bursed them for about half of their costs. Other govern
mental programs proliferated. Sometimes these new public
expenditures were wholly federal, but often they were joint
federal—state expenditures
also for additional and more recent work on the subject of
governmental dysfunctionalism see, Controversies of State and
Local Government, edited by Mavis Mann Reeves and Parris N.
Glendening (Boston: Allan and Bacon, Inc., l972) Ronald
James Liebert, Disintegration and Political Action: The Chang
ing Functions of City Government in America (New York: Aca
demic Press, Inc., 1976); Anthony James Cantanese, Planning
and Local Politics (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Saga Pub., Inc.,1974).
6Maxwell A. James and Richard J. Aronson, Financing
State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institute, 1977) , pp. 18—19.
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Reinforcing the permanence of this interventionist
role of the federal government in matters of local social
concern was the centralizing bias emanating from judicial
doctrine in the 1930’s. Since the 1880’s the Supreme Court
had marked out a fairly clear boundary between federal and
state activities, standing as a referee to solve jurisdic
tional disputes. Its new bias seemed to reflect its percep
tion in shifts in social philosophy and as a reaction to
contradictory precedents. This new interpretation of the
welfare clause in the Constitution placed no judicial limits
on the amounts or purposes of federal spending. Recently
the Supreme Court has become even more unwilling to place
restraints on government regulation of economic affairs.
Viewed from another perspective, the new role of the
federal government, in matters of local social concerns,
seemed to be a reaction to apparent weaknesses in the free
market economy. Prior to the Great Depression the major
explicit goal of public economic policy in the United States
was to maintain stability of the price level. By achieving
this goal it was believed that the natural forces operating
in the market—place would normally assure expanding employ
ment, economic growth, and equilibrium in international pay—
ments. However, the 1930’s brought financial collapse,
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industrial stagnation, severe and protracted unemployment,
and disorder in the international system of trade and pay
ments. Naturally these events dispelled confidence in those
who believed in the ability of the economy to automatically
provide sustained groh and employment.7
The Great Depression precipitated the FDR New Deal
legislation, calling for widespread federal grants to amelio
rate the critically depressed economic conditions of the
country and the general socially destitute population. This
legislation offered the means by which the administrative
branch of the federal government would be able to contend
with these problems. New Deal legislation provided for the
creation of the categorical grant programs to local govern
ments and private agencies. The categorical grant strategy
prevailed until the enactment of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 (generally referred to as Revenue
8
Sharing)
Despite this new expanding role of the federal govern—
ment, the New Deal legislation and many other social legisla—
tive enactments, and despite the billions of dollars spent on
7Ibid., p. 19.
8Martin Schnitzer and Chen Yung—Ping, Public Finance
and Public Policy Issues (San Francisco: International Text
books Co., 1972), p. 15.
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categorical grant programs, by 1960 two—fifths of the nation
still lived in a state of economic deprivation in the United
States. This figure represents thirty-four million people in
families and four million unattached individuals (that is,
economically unattached to family units) who lived in
poverty; thirty-seven million people in families and two
million unattached individuals lived in deprivation. The
total of seventy—seven million people comprised two fifths
of the United States population in l960.
The federal categorical grant—in—aid programs have
come under increasing criticism from state and local govern
ments because of their general overall administrative complex
ities and functional impotence. Although the federal budget
by 1973 was providing $43.8 billion in domestic aid, a five
fold increase in ten years, state and local governments were
experiencing perhaps their most critical crises. Although
the intention of the categorical grant-in-aid system was to
provide systematic assistance to state and local governments
and non—profit organizations, it failed grossly in this re
gard and really was not a system. By 1970 it was an
9Taken from Sweezy and Magdoff, The Dynamics of U.S.
Capitalism, p. 21. The source of the percentage figure and
the statement were taken from Poverty and Deprivation in the
U.S., Conference on Economic Progress, Washington, D.C.,
April 1962.
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Additional state and local criticisms of the Categor
ical grant_jfl
j system can be summarized as follows.
— the matching distorted local budget
ary
priorities
— the System precluded a compreheflsiv attack on com
munity problems
— the 5ystem was inherently inefficient
— it compounded the already imminent problems caused by
local governe Proliferatio
n
10Rih D. Thompson Revenue Sharin : A New Era in
derlism (Washi
ngo D.C.: Revenue Advisory Service,
1973), p. 22.
P. 27, and it in turn was taken from the Ad




— it prevented local implementation control.’2
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972
reflects the federal government’s effort at reform in that
it sought to deal with the tremendous fiscal crises at the
state and local levels. The fiscal crises had been worsen
ing since the 1950’s while state and local pressure had been
intensifying. The demands for greater social service bene
fits at the local level were frustrated by the inability of
local governments to raise the necessary revenues for these
expenditures. These frustrations along with the inabilities
and insensitivity of the categorical grant—in—aid system
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precipitated in part the revenue sharing reform measures.
It is not the intention of this study to discuss
revenue sharing in detail but it may be useful at this point
to make a few general comments about its function and struc
tural character.
The main purposes of the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972
were: (1) to reduce fiscal disparities between states and
among local governments; (2) to stabilize state and local
taxes and thereby help produce a more progressive national
pp. 30—31.
13Reuss, Revenue—Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst, pp. 3-36.
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tax structure; (3) to assist in the financing of needed state
and local services; and (4) to move in the direction of gov
ernmental decentralization by increasing the discretion of
state and local governments in determining the uses of
federal grants.’4 The 1972 Revenue Sharing Act authorized
$30.6 billions to be allocated by special formula to fifty
states and 39,000 units of local governments.’5 The revenue
sharing resources were to be used by state and local govern
ments for public safety, environmental protection, public
transportation, health, recreation, libraries, social ser
vices for the poor or aged, and financial administration.16
The above refer mainly to what is generally known as general
revenue sharing. The special revenue sharing programs are
similar to the categorical grants, they are for special pro
grammatic purposes.
On October 13, 1976, President Gerald Ford signed
into law the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act Amend
ments of 1976, which extended the general revenue sharing
14Richard Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., Revenue
Sharing: The Second Round (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institute, 1977), p. 160.
15Ibid., p. IX.
16Thompson, Revenue Sharing: A New Era, P. 22.
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program for three and three—quarter years and authorized the
spending of $25.6 billion for the period of the extension
legislation. The allocation formula remained the same but
there were changes in three other important areas: (1) the
Civil Rights provisions were strengthened; (2) new require
ments for public participation, involving hearings and pub
lication of budget information were included; (3) the audit
ing and accounting requirements of the Act were strengthened.17
The general revenue sharing program is considered to
be an attempt on the part of the federal government to ad
dress the fiscal crises dilemma with greater efficiency.
State and local governments are viewed as partners in this
efficiency thrust. By and large, state and local governments
are given considerable degree of flexibility in the implemen
tation of the social service programs, as long as they remain
within the eight major programmatic areas. However, implied
in the new intergovernmental relationship is one important
caveat and that is, state and local governments will proceed
with the modernization of these governmental units. Effici
ency in government is the underpinning basis justifying the
revenue sharing reform policy. Inefficient state and local
17
Nathan and Adams, Jr., Revenue Sharing: The Second
Round, p. 160.
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government arrangements are viewed as a detriment to the
revenue sharing program.
For the past two and one—half decades the federal
government has been actively supporting multi—state and sub—
state planning and development districts. The categorical
grant-in—aid system was tied into the perceived objectives
of these quasi—governmental arrangements and so are the new
revenue sharing programs. Given the extent of the federal
governments’ support for regionalism and its current emphasis
on economic and administrative efficiency, it seems reason
able to suggest that revenue—sharing will become more a part
of this process in the future.
The revenue sharing movement can be viewed as a
centralized—decentralized public sector reformation program.
It is decentralized to the extent that the state and local
governments are given a share of federal revenues to expend
in broad programmatic areas. It is centralized to the extent
that these revenues are federal revenues and the President
does have administrative and monitoring responsibilities and
can use pressure through these means and other administrative
mechanisms to achieve certain compliances. Although the
revenue sharing program has a legislative mandate, the Execu
tive Branch of government has a great deal of latitude in the
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implementation of this program. The historical involvement
of the federal government in regional planning and develop—
ment will be discussed below, with the intention of showing
that this involvement with regionalism suggests a greater
symbiotic relationship for regionalism and revenue sharing
in the future.
CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF REGIONALISM IN THE
UNITED STATES
In discussing the subject of regionalism one must
make the distinction between regionalism as an effort at
government consolidation and regionalism as a planning and
coordinating mechanism for area—wide soclo—economic develop
ment. Both are alternative responses to dysfunctionalism in
local government and to its inability to offer social and
economic redress to pressing concerns in its local community.
The difference is seen in the means in which each has chosen
to employ to achieve these objectives. The former has
elected to seek consolidations of city—county, or county—
county governments for the expressed purpose of creating new
governmental structures. Whereas, the latter are legal crea—
tions of state and local governments, empowered to perform
mainly planning and coordinating functions for several or
more governmental units. A logical expression of the multi
jurisdictional planning and development creations is their
23
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transformation into regional governments, but there is no
specific provisions for this in their enabling legislation.
Support for government consolidation has fluctuated
greatly since 1805. Enthusiasm for consolidation was at a
high level in 1805, with the consolidation of New Orleans
and Orleans Parish, Louisiana, but waned to a very low point
shortly thereafter.’ Then in 1947, with the consolidation
of the governments of Baton Rouge and East Baton Parish,
Louisiana, interest was rekindled. From 1805 to 1947 there
were six city—county consolidations, all by legislative
action. Between 1947—1971 there were eleven additional city—
county mergers, ten by referendum and the eleventh followed
the legislative pattern. Presently there are thirty-six
areas considering similar mergers. Between 1921 and 1971
there were twenty—two areas where voters rejected mergers
(see figure 1)
It would certainly be an understaement to suggest
that government consolidation efforts have not had its prob
lems. Given the fact that there were only eighteen success
ful city—county mergers since 1805, certainly can be
‘Charlene Caile, “Bringing the City and County To
gether,” The American County 38:1 (January 1972): 9.
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perceived as an expression of unwillingness on the part of
the general public and local governments to relinquish power,
or to part with tradition. Perhaps this may be a reason,
though a speculative reason at best, why the present form of
multi—jurisdictional regionalism is being pursued so indi
rectly, or so cautiously.
Multi-jurisdictional regionalism had its genesis in
the twentieth century. Its evolution reflects a continuous,
though cautious trend towards area—wide planning, particularly
in metropolitan areas. By 1930, gaining in momentum, multi-
jurisdictional regionalism began to win more and more local
public officials and bureaucrats to its fold. More city
planners, city and county chief executives began to see the
need for officially sanctioned planning on an area—wide basis.
Quasi—independent public advisory planning commissions, em
bracing the concepts of progressive political reform and
scientific management were formed, though still lacking,
relatively speaking, significant influence.
The following are examples of these quasi-public
planning commissions. Two of the examples are private under
takings but by far the majority were public.
— In 1902, a Boston Metropolitan Improvement Commission
was created, professing comprehensive planning
26
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— In 1909, the Plan of Chicago, which was a private
undertaking, placed the city in its regional context
and pointed out the need for central development be
yond city limits.3
— From 1913 until 1915, Pennsylvania law authorized a
Suburban Metropolitan Planning Commission to levy
assessment and prepare coordinated comprehensive
plans of highway roads, parks and parkways, and all
other means of intercommunication, water supply,
sewerage and sewage disposal, collection and disposal
of garbage, housing, sanitation and health, play
grounds, civic centers, and other public improvements
for a district encompassing more than 130 local gov
ernments within a 25 mile radius of Philadelphia.4
— 1921-1929, a private group, the Committee on Regional
Planning of New York, worked to produce a plan for the
5,528 square mile and 500 incorporated—community area.5
- 1922, the first metropolitan county planning commission
was established in Los Angeles, California, to serve as
an advisory body to the County Board of Supervisors in
executing their planning responsibilities for the en
tire habitable region of the county and their control
over planning in all of its unincorporated places.6
2Bureau of Public Affairs, Boston College, “Metropoli
tan Boston: A Fresh Approach,” (Boston: The Bureau, August
1967), pp. 9—10.
3william I. Goodman, “Principles and Practices of
Urban Planning,” pp. 100—109; Mellier G. Scott, ed., American
City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of
California Press, 1969), P. 20.
4Scott, American City Planning, p. 176.
5Ibid., pp. 200, 223—24, 261—64.
6lbid p. 206; Goodman, “Principles and Practices,”
p. 23.
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During the early days of the Great Depression multi
jurisdictional regionalism efforts witnessed a downturn, but
in early 1933, with the advent of the Public Works Adminis
tration, and its National Planning Board (NPB) it began to
regain ground. The $3.3 billion federal public works pro
gram-—with its planning requirement for federally sponsored
state and multi-state planning programs, and its concern with
housing issues, county zoning, and the satellite city concept,
had a significant impact on the revival of regional planning.7
In 1934, there were only eighty—five metropolitan multi—
county and county planning bodies and twenty—three regional
planning agencies in existence, but by 1937 there were 506
metropolitan multicounty and county planning agencies, of
which at least 216 were official public bodies. Two years
later, metropolitan planning agencies, or regional planning
boards, commissions, or associations were operating in at
least thirty major cities.8
During the war years and shortly thereafter, multi
jurisdictional regionalism continued to grow at a steady pace.
7Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate
Districts, Volume I (Washington, D.C., October 1973), p. 54.
8lbid., p. 55.
29
Seven new public regional planning bodies were created and a
number of citizen’s planning committees were reactivated.
Most of these were county agencies. However, after World
War II more multi—county/city organizations were formed, like
the Atlanta Regional Metropolitan Planning Commission which
was created in 1947. Also created that same year were,
Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, the
Virginia Regional Planning and Economic Development Commis
sion, and the Regional Planning Commission of Reno, Sparks,
and Washoe County, Nevada.9
It was not until the 1950’s that the federal govern
ment became aggressively involved in multi—jurisdictional
regionalism. This intervention on the part of the federal
government transformed it from primarily an independent
undertaking of state and local governments to a largely
financed surrogate for metropolitan government and a tool of
10
the federal public sector.
The first federal support to local regionalism began
with the Congressional passage of the Housing Act of
9lbid., p. 56.
10National Service to Regional Councils, Regionalism:
A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental
Relations (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 4.
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195411 Section 701 of this 1954 Housing Act established
urban planning assistance to metropolitan areas. Five years
following its passage, more than 100 metropolitan planning
agencies were created and by late 1967, there were 216
regional planning commissions. Figure 2 indicates the types
of regional councils developed between the period 1963
through 1970. And, as NSRC suggests, they were created to
take advantage of the new federal financial assistance.
In 1965 the 701 planning assistance provision of the
1954 Housing Act was amended to specifically make councils
of local government elected officials eligible for federal
funds. The Council of Government (COG’s), associations of
local government, represented by local officials, came into
existence in response to 1965 amendment to the Housing Act.
Two hundred COG’s were established shortly after this amend
ment was passed.12
The passage of the 1965 amendment to the Housing Act
and the passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Act of 1966 suggests the federal government’s determination
11Keith Ward, Metropolitan Cooperation and Coordina
tion: Tennessee Council of Government (Knoxville: The Univer







1963 1967 1970 1963 1967 1970 1963b 1967 1970
Multi—County 38 97 101 38 41 50 —— 56 51
Single
Countya 88 119 152 88 91 93 —— 28 59
Totals
l26
216 253 126 132 143 —— 84 110
asingle county with representation from cities
bNo survey was made of these in 1963 study
cResponsible agencies for 142 Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas
Source: National Service to Regional Councils, Regionalism:
A New Dimension in Local Government and Inter—
Government Relations, Washington, ID. C.
to discourage support for unifunctional agencies and to en
courage support for the more multi—functional agencies. The
1965 Housing Act Amendment made councils with local elected
officials representation eligible for federal funds. The
1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act
made it a requirement, as of July 1, 1967, that all applica
tions desiring federal assistance, under a variety of pro
grams, had to be reviewed by an area—wide planning agency,
13
composed of local elected officials.
13Ibid
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The United States Congress passed a series of legis
lation between 1966 and 1973 furthering the federal govern
ment’s position relative to exclusive support for multi—
jurisdictional planning and development agencies.
1. intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
This act expanded upon past requirements for inter
governmental cooperation. Portions of the Act directed the
President to formulate a procedure and set of regulations to
govern review of Federally—assisted projects. The Office of
Management and Budget issued Circular A—95 to formally imple
ment this Act.
2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
This Act expanded upon the review and comment pro
cedures. The major focus of this Act is the provision for
comment upon the environmental impact of proposed projects by
federal, state and local agencies.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, Section 601,
stated that “. . . no person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be sub
jected to discrimination under any program or activity re
ceiving Federal financial assistance.” Title VIII, Section
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801 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 declared that it is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States,
and required all executive departments and agencies to admin
ister their programs and activities relating to housing and
urban development in a manner affirmatively in furtherance
of the purpose of that title.
On March 8, 1972, the Office of Management and Budget,
in revising a portion of Circular A—95, provided that
public agencies charged with enforcing state and local
civil rights laws (should be provided) with opportunity to
participate in review process . . .“
4. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as
amended
This legislation was enacted by Congress in response
to concern over increasing crime rates and the apparent inef
fectiveness of state and local efforts to significantly
reduce crime. The Safe Streets Act created the Law Enforce—
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) to administer large
scale financial and technical aid to state and local govern
ments, primarily through a block grant program to the state.
In order to qualify to receive federal funds, a state must
establish a state planning agency which must submit an annual
plan for reducing crime and improving the criminal justice
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system. Once the state plan is approved and funds made
available, state and local agencies may submit grant appli
cations. All such applications must comply with the pro
visions of 0MB Circular A-95 in addition to appropriate
federal and state legislation and all policies of the Council
on Criminal Justice.
5. Crime Control Act of 1973
Under provisions of this Act, state criminal justice
planning agencies were required to provide procedures for
submission and review of annual plans from regional planning
units and/or units of general local government having a
population of at least 250,000.
Administrative procedures based on this Act, con
tained in the Guidance Manual of Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, required that all applications for LEA funds
be consistent with regional and state plans, and that, as
evidence of regional consistency, all applications bear the
14
endorsement of the regional clearinghouse.
Congress also passed legislation making support
available for special economically depressed regions
‘4Richmond Regional Planning District Commission
(RRPDC), A-95 Procedure Guide and Legislative Background
(Richmond, Virginia, 1976), p. 1.
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encompassing multi—jurisdictional units of local government.
These special regions, referred to as Economic Development
Districts (EDD’s) were created with the passage of the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. Its main purpose
is general economic development and creating jobs in areas of
high unemployment. More specifically, the EDD’s are to
develop and implement Overall Economic Development Programs
(OEDP’s) with sustained growth as its end. The EDD’s are
funded by the Economic Development Administration, U.S. De
partment of Commerce.’5
The 1965 Regional Development Act provided for the
creation of Local Development Districts (LDD’s) . Structur
ally and in intent, they are similar to the EDD’s. That is,
they are regional councils coordinating public and private
efforts within multi—county areas to promote economic and
social development. The difference being that the LDD’s are
located in economically depressed substate areas in the
13—state Appalachian Region.16
A word about the multi-state planning and development
15National Service to Region Councils, A New Dimension
in Local Government on Intergovernmental Relations (Washing
ton, D.C.O, p. 5.
16Ibid p. 6.
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commission deserves brief mention. In the United States, the
multi—state planning and development commissions are crea
tions of the national government. Structurally, these com
missions consist of a number of contiguous states, located
in an identifiable region of the country. Their mission is
to develop economic and general social programs for the solu
tion of problems at the multi—state level, and to further
national, state, and local interests in a coordinated, cen
tralized and decentralized manner, respectively.
There are at present six federal regional planning
and development districts. (See Figure 3.) Each federal
unit has a federal co—chairman and a state co—chairman. The
federal co-chairman is appointed by the President, to whom
he is directly accountable. The state co—chairman is elected
on a rotating basis by the states, from among their numbers.
The other policy—making representatives include those gover
nors of the states in the respective regions. The federal
commissions are funded by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
or as in the case of the Appalachian Regional Commission, by
special congressional appropriations.
The l96Os witnessed the creation of multi—state,
state and substate planning and development commissions and
as aforementioned, as a response to federal involvement in
FIGURE 3
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce FCRC
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regionalism and the new federal grant requirements. During
this period most state governments enacted enabling legisla
tion allowing for the creation of the substate planning and
development commissions.
The new federal legislative and administrative re
quirements have had a great impact on the development of co
operative efforts by local government. The national govern
ment has used both the “carrot” and the “stick” to foster
regional planning and local government cooperation. With the
“carrot,” federal funds were made available to plan, coordi
nate and review interlocal community development.
Early 20th century efforts at Multi—jurisdictional
regionalism appeared to encourage structural political effi
ciency for achieving economies of scale in public service
delivery, while taking into account the complexity and diver
sity of area—wide needs and local interests. With the in
creased recognition of the need for local interdependence,
multi—jurisdictional regionalism was looked upon increasingly
as a useful procedural device through which common area—wide
objectives could be achieved, while still being regarded as a




autonomy. The more they gained popularity the more this
seemed to reflect a growing intolerance for local govern
mental fragmentation and dysfunctionalism, particularly in
light of the increasing central pull of suburbanization.’8
Suburbanization required greater area—wide planning
and coordination, and multi—jurisdictional regionalism offered
to satisfy this need. So in line with this, one sees in the
1930’s that the scale of planning was expanded to include
larger geographical areas and terms like “regional city” and
“the total metropolis” began to appear. The scope was also
broadened functionally to encompass socio—economic human con
cerns, as well as physical factors. Consistent with this
type of development was the concern for the practical and
political implications of regional planning, and with the
subsequent need to bring planning into closer contact with
day—to—day affairs of local government.
Multi—jurisdictional regionalism seemed to evolve
more into a federal response to dysfunctionalism in local
government, the inability of local governments to respond
adequately to changing socio/economic requirements of its
-8Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Dis
tricts, Volume I (October 1973), Washington, D.C., p. 51.
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citizens. Multi-jurisdictional regionalism began as a pri
vate state and local effort during the early part of this
century but has become a major concern of the federal public
sector. Federal control of the purse strings has transformed
functionally, if not structurally, the state and local public
sector’s relationship to their social concerns. At the
present time regionalism appears to be one step away from
regional governments. As of now, the multi—state and sub—
state planning and development commissions do not have the
authority to implement regional programs, without the consent
of each unit of government within its geographical jurisdic
tion. However, all requests for utilization of federal re
sources must be reviewed and approved by the regional
apparatus, which has determined to a great extent the nature
of socio—economic development at the local level. The reve
nue sharing program is tied to the regional arrangement.
The utilization of its resources must fit into the regional




3. Georgia Act No. 123, 1967——created the State Planning
and Programming Bureau, as part of the office of the
Governor. Essentially this office was created to pro
mote and coordinate socio—economic development on a
statewide basis. It provided for the establishment
of a statewide clearinghouse, to coordinate the APOC
planning and development activities, and those of all
other agencies. More specifically its functions were:
——to prepare and submit a bi—annual socio—economic
development plan to the Governor for his presen
tation to the General Assembly
——to prepare an inventory of all federal programs
——to provide technical assistance
—-to administer the APDC state funding and to set
the funding criteria which required the APDC’s:
.to have a minimum of five counties in their
regional membership
.to raise a minimum of $15,000 per year from
local funds
.to hire a qualified executive director
—-to match each dollar of APDC money with two dcl
lars of state funds up to $15,000, then dollar
for dollar over $15,000, up to $20,000.6
4. Georgia Act No. 1066, 1970——amended Georgia Act No.
123 to meet the requirements of the Federal Inter
governmental Cooperative Act of 1967 (particularly
section 201 and Title IV — see Appendix B) and various
U.S. Bureau of the budget circulars. This federal act
essentially required APOC and state review of each
request for Federal financial assistance to determine
whether these requests met the requirements of the
regional and state plans for socio—economic develop
ment.
——the Bureau’s name was changed to the Office of
Planning and Budget and made state planning a
joint concern of the Office of Planning and
Budget and the Department of Industry and Trade,
thereby linking the planning and budget processes
to the states’ commercial and industrial activ
ities.
6Georgia Act No. 123, 1967.
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——required an annual update of the state bi—annual
development plan
—--required a human resource utilization and eco
nomic development plan for each APDC.7
5. Georgia Act No. 5, 1971—-created the Atlanta Regional
Commission 8
The above legislative history spans a thirteen-year
period and as one can deduce from these it seems as if there
was a conscientious effort on the part of the Georgia General
Assembly to both rationalize a more functional role for the
APOC’s within the context of the state/substate plan for
comprehensive planning and development and a willingness on
its part to conform to federal guidelines to qualify for
federal financial resources. The geographical and program
matic scope of the APDC’s have been broadened and integrated
into a formal statewide planning and development process.
More will be said relative to this particular legislative
development pattern, but now let us turn to a discussion of
the general characteristics of the APDC’s.
Inclusive of the Atlanta Regional Commission, which
was created by a special act of the State Legislature in 1971,
there are eighteen APDC’s in the state of Georgia. All one
7Georgia Act No. 1066, 1970.
8
Georgia Act No. 5, 1971.
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hundred and fifty—nine counties have memberships in one of
the APOC’s. (See map entitled, Figure 4 for a delineation
of their boundaries.)
According to Georgia Law, each APDC must have a policy
board consisting of elected officials and private citizens.
The law requires each county to select at least one member
of the APOC board to represent the county. City elected
officials or their designee may also serve on the APDc board
but their number is not specified by law. (Figure 5 describes
the actual composition and other characteristics of the APOC
board structures as of 1976.)
In order to qualify for federal grant—in—aid programs,
or to become qualified to perform the A—95 clearinghouse func
tion, the APDC’s are required to have minority representation
on the boards. ‘Minority here refers to racial rather than
sex.” The exact percentage of minority representation is
left to the discretion of the APDC’s. Georgia law makes no
provision requiring minority representation. As of this
writing, no APDC has more than forty percent minority repre
sentation.
Each APDC board has an executive committee that super
vises the implementation of policies, gives direction and
assistance to the executive director and other technical
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FIGURE 4
AREA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSiONS
(EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1972)
NORTH CAROUNA
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24 18 2 4
31 16 5 10 85*
34 16 8 10 22
15 5 4 6 8
27 20 4 7 28
30 10 9 11 27
33 19 3 11 38
29 21 0 8 147
27 12 9 8 14
30 2 8 20 25
23 0 7 23 11
22 11 6 5 19
21 11 3 7 23
24 13 0 11 25
23 12 7 4 25
19 12 6 1 34
21 8 5 8 20
33 8 8 17 25
466 214 94 171 597
Source: Georgia Department of Community Development, Factbook, Number 1975
*Source: Atlanta Regional Commission 1975 Annual Report
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staff persons at intervals between monthly board meetings.
The APDC by-laws provides for standing committees, generally
for economic development, environmental protection, law en
forcement, housing, land use, and solid waste disposal.
There are also provisions to establish ad hoc committees for
the performance of specific functions. The APDC board also
hires the executive director, who in turn hires the required
technical and administrative staff.
Broadly speaking and under the terms of the enabling
legislation, the board of directors and staff of the APOC’s
are responsible for preparing a master plan for the develop
ment of their overall geographical jurisdiction. Under the
terms of their contract with the Division of Community Devel
opment, the APOC’s agree to prepare detail data plans and
policies for the development of:
a. a continuing program of research, including descrip
tions and projections of area population and eco
nomic analysis of economic and governmental prob—
lems analysis of area potentialities; studies
offering development possibilities;
b. a continuing program of area planning, including
the formulation and maintenance of a development
plan for land use and transportation;
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c. a continuing program to assist cities to develop
and coordinate local plans;
d. a continuing program of resource development, in
cluding recommendations for specific proposals
and procedures outlining public and private de
velopment programs capable of short term achieve
ments;
e. a continuing program of public information;
f. a continuing program to compile and make available
information required by the Bureau to carry out an
in—depth reconnaissance and analysis of each com
mission’s regional planning program, problems and
opportunities
The Georgia APDC’s also provide management assistance
services to local governments. Conventional wisdom indicates
that small, especially rural local governmental units often
lack the technical know—how to manage their affairs effici
ently. To say that some local governments are still operat
ing from their “hip pockets,” or from a “show box,” is not a
stretch of the imagination. APDC staff members devote much
of their time, preparing budgets, program applications,
9Slash Pine APDC, “Eighth Annual Report,” (Waycross,
Georgia, 1972)
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drafting local ordinances for local governments and training
their elected officials.
The above chronological review of Georgia legislative
actions, relating specifically to the creation and definition
of the structure and functions of the APDC’s, and the general
description of their ongoing activities, have been presented
primarily to give the overview picture; and to underscore
the evolutionary process leading to the refinement of their
scope of work and authority. As we have seen, structurally
the APDC’s have evolved into multi—county regional units,
and functionally they have acquired the general responsibili
ties for planning and coordinating socio—economic development
for these substate structures. The policy decisions are the
functions of their boards of directors, consisting of elected
representatives from each unit of government in the APDC area,
or their designee.
The main objective of the APDC’s is to devise
policies and develop programs to assist local governments
maximize the use of economic and natural resources for the
betterment of the local communities.
CHAPTER V
A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THREE
BASIC APDC TYPES
As previously mentioned, there are eighteen APDC’s in
Georgia. It has been determined that they are creations of
both state and local governments; that they are also supported
financially primarily by the federal government; and that each
have similar structural arrangements and are authorized to
perform essentially the same functional activities. The con
cern of this chapter is to review in more detail the on—going
activities of the APDC’s with a view towards ascertaining how
the broad mission of substate regionalism is being interpreted
and implemented; and with a view towards theorizing about
their future functional activities.
In surveying the literature on the APDC’s, certain
basic characteristics were delineated permitting their divi
sion into three relative distinct categories. First there
are the urban APDC’s whose socio—economic development prob—
lems are similar in nature and whose planning, development,
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and coordinating activities follow a similar pattern. The
second and third categories can be classified as passive and
active groupings, respectively. The passive category views
the AFDC mission in terms of a tool for “propping up” or
revitalizing local governments, with the maintenance of their
autonomy in mind. The third category, the more activist
types, jiews substate regionalism as a modernizing agency for
local communities, willing to pursue planning, development
and program implementation with a view towards replacing
archaic local governments with more useful regional types.
Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, the Atlanta
Regional Commission, the Slash Pine APDC, and the Georgia
Mountain APDC have been selected.
ARC is the largest of the urban APDC grouping, both
in population and programmatically. The main feature dis
tinguishing it from the other APDC’s in this grouping is
basically one of programmatic scale. A review of ARC’s
activities should shed sufficient light on the general char
acteristics of the urban grouping. This section will review
the evolutionary history of regionalism in Metropolitan
Atlanta, its structural characteristics, its general mission
and several of its main ongoing activities.
In a previous chapter, it was noted that Metropolitan
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Atlanta was an early pioneer in the area of regional plan
ning. However, by 1970 Atlanta Metropolitan planning was in
a state of disarray, with four major agencies performing
regional functions for the five county metropolitan area,
the Atlanta Regional Metropolitan Planning Comission (ARMPC);
the Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments
(MACLOC); the Metropolitan Council for Health (MAC-Health);
and the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS) . Confusion
and overlapping abounded and the interest of regionalism was
being seriously impeded. In 1971, in an effort to address
this dilemma, the Georgia General Assembly passed Law No. 5,
combining the staff functions and policy authority previously
held by these four regional authorities into one new regional
agency, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) . Initially
ARC’s territory included only five counties. Douglas and
Rockdale Counties were added in 1972.
Before these last two counties became a part of the
ARC’s jurisdiction, its board of directors consisted of
twenty—three members, twelve elected members, and eleven
citizen members. The twelve elected officials consisted of
the county commissioner chairmen from the five counties; the
mayor of Atlanta and one Atlanta alderman; and one mayor
from each of the five counties, elected by the mayors of
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each of the respective counties. The citizen members were
selected by the twelve elected officials from equally popu
lated districts, disregarding county lines and political sub
divisions. At present, ARC has thirty—one board members,
sixteen of which are elected and fifteen appointed.
ARC has a stable financial base, which is provided
for by formula with specific allocations coming from the
seven counties and the city of Atlanta as follows:
Counties which do not include any part of Atlanta pay
30 for each person living in the county, plus $2,000;
counties which include a part of Atlanta pay 30 for
each person living outside Atlanta, plus l2 for each
person in that part of the county which is in Atlanta,
plus $2,000; and the city of Atlanta pays l8 for each
person plus $2,000. The minimum contribution is
$5,000 per year.’
This financial base is in turn used to acquire additional
monies from various federal agencies. As of 1976, ARC had
an operational budget of $2.9 million. The average operating
budget for the other APDC’s is approximately $650,000 per
year.
The initial comprehensive program for ARC was organ
ized into three major categories:
A. Program Area One, provided for a comprehensive
update and reappraisal of the regional plan.
1. Completion of the regional inventory in land
use, commercial floor space and employment.
2. Formulation of an update economic base study.
1Georgia Act No. 123, 1967. Georgia Act 1066, 1977.
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3. Extensive assessment of health manpower and
facilities in the five county area.
B. Program Area Two, is devoted to special studies:
1. A comprehensive Chattohoochee River Corridor
Study.
2. A solid waste plan refinement.
3. A crime analysis impact for the City of Atlanta
under the Law Enforcement and Administration
Act’s (LEAA) special high crime impact program
(a $20 million program)
4. A comprehensive study of the rapid transit
corridors and their impact on land use and
development.
C. Program Area Three, recognizes ARC’s continuing
responsibilities to include
1. Annual estimates of population and housing.
2. Regional criminal justice planning and informa
tion exchange.
3. Professional planning and coordinating support
of local family planning facilities.2
As the ARC “1975 Annual Report’t indicates ARC adopted
development guides in a number of functional areas during
1975. This procedure was in accord with section 13 of
Georgia Laws 1971, Act No. 5, which gives ARC responsibility
to adopt policy statements, goals standards, programs, and
maps prescribing orderly economic development, public and
private, of its seven county area. The following programmatic
listing summarizes and explains those development guides
2Georgia’s Program of Planning for Development (a
pamphlet published by the Georgia Power Company, Atlanta,
Georgia)
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adopted by ARC during 1975.
NURSING HOME DEVELOPMENT GUIDE (February 26, 1975).
Nursing home bed need projections through the year
1975 for the Atlanta Region. Published as ‘Nursing
Home Development Guide.’
HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT GUIDE UPDATE 1974 (February 26,
1975) . Update of previously—adopted guide to reflect
updated regional population projections. Published
as “Hospital Development Guide Update 1974.”
PRIORITIES FOR PARKS PROJECTS (February 26, 1975).
A priority system for parks projects in the Atlanta
Region proposed for federal funding during FY 1976
and a detailed display of parks projects in each
priority category. Published as “A Resolution to
Establish Priorities for Parks Projects for Funding
During Fiscal Year (FY) 1976.”
WATER AND SEWER PLAN AMENDMENT (March 26, 1975).
An amendment to ARC’S 1988 Water and Sewerage Plan
to include Gwinnett County’s withdrawal of forty
million gallons of water per day (m.g.d.) from
Lake Lanier and to include Gwinnett County’s water
treatment plant at a capacity of not more than forty
m.g.d. Published as “A resolution to Amend the Water
and Sewer Plan to Include the Gwinnett County Lake
Lanier Water Project.”
REGIONAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM (April 23, 1975). An
updated regional capital improvements program in
areas such as hospitals, parks, sewerage, water
supply, nursing homes, housing and transportation,
adopted as an interim development guide pending
adoption of the Regional Development Plan. Published
as “1975-1979 Metropolitan Atlanta Regional Improve
ments Program: Interim Development Guide.”
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PLAN, FIRST EDITION (April 23,
1975) . Policy statements in areas of physical,
mental, environmental health and social services in
Atlanta Region. Published as “Comprehensive Health
Plan.”
57
HOME CARE SERVICES PROGRAM (April 23, 1975) . Recom
mendations concerning the development of a coordinated
and comprehensive service system through which the
elderly can secure and maintain maximum independence
and dignity in their own homes and through which the
elderly can overcome individual and social barriers
to economic and personal independence. Published as
“A Home Care Services Program.”
LEAA PRIORITIES FOR 1975 (May 28, 1975) . ARC priorities
for review of applications for Law Enforcement Assist
ance Administration (LEAA) Block Grant funds for sub
mission to the State Crime Commission. Published as
“A Resolution by the Atlanta Regional Commission Recom
mending Priorities for Block Grant Applications for
FY 1975 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
Funds.”
AIRPORT SYSTEM PLAN (June 30, 1975) . Plan for meeting
aviation needs, both air carrier and general, through
the year 2000 in the Atlanta Region. Development guide
applies oniy to that portion of the plan which falls
within the seven-county Atlanta Region. Published as
“Atlanta Region Airport System Plan: Summary Report”
and other supporting documents.
TRANSPORTATION PLAN AMENDMENTS (June 30, 1975). An
amendment to adopted regional transportation plan and
regional transportation improvements program to add
improvements to State Route 74 in Fulton County
between Interstate 85 and U.S. 29 near Fairburn.
Published as “A Resolution by the Atlanta Regional
Commission to Amend the Adopted Regional Transporta
tion Plan and the Atlanta Regional Transportation
Improvements Program.”
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION PRIORITIES (July 23,
1975) . A priority listing of projects in Gwinnett
and Douglas counties recommended by the Atlanta
Regional Commission for funding by the Appalachian
Regional Commission. Published as “Resolution
Adopting the 1976 Appalachian Regional Commission
Priority Listing.”
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRIORITIES (July 23, 1975). Regional
criminal justice program priorities for FY 1976 as
requested by the State Crime Commission. Published as
“A Resolution by the Atlanta Regional Commission for
Adopting the Priorities for Criminal Justice Programs
FY 1976,” and including in “Phase I Program Identifying
and Working Toward the Reduction of Crime.”
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR TRANSPORTATION FOR HANDICAPPED
AND ELDERLY (August 27, 1976) . A set of goals and
objectives to direct drafting of a regional transporta
tion plan to meet the special needs of the handicapped
and elderly. Published as “A Resolution by the Atlanta
Regional Commission Adopting Goals and Objectives for
a Regional Transportation System to Serve the Handicapped
and Elderly of the Seven—County Atlanta Region.”
REGIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN (September 24, 1975)
Statements of problems and recommended solutions in the
areas of police, courts, corrections and juvenile
justice in the Atlanta Region. Published as “Phase I
Program Identifying and Working Toward the Reduction of
Crime.”
FIVE-YEAR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICE DELIVERY PLAN
(September 24, 1975) . Projections of family planning
service delivery needs in the Atlanta Region 1975
through 1979, and recommendations on meeting the needs.
Published as “Five-Year Family Planning Service
Delivery Plan.”
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (September 24, 1975) . Set
of land use and transportation policies, based on
ARC—accepted socioeconomic projections through the
year 2000, for the Atlanta Region. Plan as a develop
ment guide contains policies as relate natural features,
development centers, highways, transit (bus and rail),
and arterial improvements. Published as “Resolution
Adopting a Regional Development Plan as a Development
Guide.” Publication of complete Regional Development
Plan expected in 1976.
AMENDMENT TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (October 22,
1975) . An amendment to Regional Development Plan to
rectify typographical error in September resolution
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adopting the Regional Development Plan as a develop
ment guide. Published as “Resolution to Amend the
Resolution Adopted September 24, 1975, Adopting a
Regional Development Plan as a Development Guide.”
AMENDMENT TO CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER STUDY (October 22,
1975) . An amendment to the adopted Chattahoochee
River Study to reflect (1) a new proposed river
crossing in the adopted Regional Development Plan,
and (2) revised U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates
of probable elevations of various floods in the
Chattahoochee River Corridor. Published as “Resolution
Amending the Chattahoochee Corridor Study.”
ALCOHOL POSITION PAPER (October 22, 1975). Needs gaps
and recommendations for meeting the problems of
alcoholism in the Atlanta Region. Published as “Alcohol
Position Paper.”
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (November 26, 1975). The
annual five—year work program of the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), adopted by
ARC, MARTA and the Board of the Georgia Department of
Transportation. Published as “Transit Development
Program.”
NURSING HOME DEVELOPMENT GUIDE UPDATE (December 10, 1975).
An update of the Nursing Home Development Guide adopted
February 26, 1975, to reflect new population estimates
and to project needs and recommendations through the
year 1980. Published as “Nursing Home Development Guide
Update l975.”
One obvious conclusion which can be drawn from ARC’s
ongoing programs is its tremendous emphasis and utilization
of its planning function in guiding regional metropolitan
socio-economic growth. The extent to which the local
3Atlanta Regional Commission, 1975 Annual Report,
Atlanta, Georgia, pp. 6—7.
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governments in the ARC region conform to these regional plan
ning guides would be a subject of study in and of itself.
However, it seems safe to conclude that there is a great deal
of conformity. ARC reviewed over a quarter of a billion
dollars of local federal grant requests for federal funds.4
Since these were approved it seems reasonable to assume that
these activities were in accord with the overall regional
plan, and that ARC gave favorable reviews.
The regional planning function emphasis of ARC seems
sensible, especially in a region with a city as dynamic and
domineering as Atlanta. It is quite possible that in the
absence of a regional framework, and a specific regional
focus, the city of Atlanta could attract an unequal share of
the federal dollars. Regional planning takes on the char
acteristic of a value to be used for the betterment of each
member of the regional consortium. The usefulness of ARC
appears to be predicated on this premise.
To maintain balance ARC has to offer particular at
tention to the needs of the other member units. This is a
delicate proposition but ARC has performed well in this
regard by offering extensive technical assistance services
4lbid.
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to the smaller units of government, where the need is great
est, and because this assistance assures them a share of the
federal dollars.
Put another way, ARC appears to view, given the
emphasis on the planning guide approach, its role in a plan
ning, coordinating, advocacy and technical assistance service
context. Its main preoccupations are those concerned with
metropolitan growth and development, crime abatement, trans
portation, social services (health—family planning) . Its
approach is indirect, in that it purports to use the power
of persuasion and logic with policy makers and public admin
istrative officials, rather than confrontative challenges of
local governmental autonomy. It neutralizes competition by
portraying itself as a facilitator of local government growth
rather than its replacement. The ARC three million dollar
budget goes a long way in maintaining a highly skilled staff
to be utilized to achieve its obvious strategy in pursuit of
its perceived mission. The planning guides proceed from an
urban context which eventually incorporates the concerns of
other elements of the regional area and which stresses more
direct technical services to the smaller units of government.
The above scenario is played out in relative terms
in the other urban APDC’s. The major city in each of these
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commissions is the focal point from which planning and devel—
opment guides are conceptualized. The regional service
balance is maintained by offering specialized technical
services to the smaller local units of government.
The second major APDC grouping is not totally dif
ferent from the previous prototype. The emphasis here is
planning as a facilitator for local growth, development and
maintenance of local governmental autonomy. The difference
lies in the fact that there is an absence of a dominant urban
influence. Rather, there is greater group homogeneity which
cooperatively, and aggressively exploits the regional arrange
ment to fulfill objectives of the local units of government.
The Slash Pine APDC is typical of the more passive
and conservative grouping. It is basically a rural APDC,
located in lower southern Georgia. Despite its small pro
grammatic size, it is probably as influential, or perhaps
even more influential than ARC, in both substate and national
planning and development circles. It was designated a Rural
Development Pilot Project in 1968 by a steering committee of
the United States Senate, Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry. This designation established Slash Pine as the
model rural APDC in the state of Georgia, and in a sense,
has been used as a laboratory of learning for the weaker
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APDC’s in Georgia and other Southeastern states.
The particular concern of Slash Pine has been the
abatement of declining population, erosion of tax bases, and
general economic decline in local subdivisions of govern
ments. The solution to this dilemma was perceived in terms
of the need for industrial growth, physical planning, land
use studies, infrastructural planning in preparation for
industrial penetration. These interests were its main plan
ning emphases. However, its strategy did not invisualize
regional industrial projects that would impact the region as
a whole, but rather regional planning of industrial projects
specifically designated for a particular local community.
This strategy has enabled Slash Pine, in 1972, to
make the following progress report:
Since 1966, almost $45,000,000 has been invested
by new and existing industries in additional facili
ties, and over 6,000 additional jobs have been
created by 189 firms.5
In ten years, Slash Pine APDC has experienced
considerable improvement in its economic conditions.
‘Qhile population continued to decline between 1960
and 1970, the rate of decline was less than that of
the prior decade, 0.7% as compared to 1.7% for 1950—
1960. Outmigration was also slowed. Current popu—
lation for the eight county area is 97,771.
5Georgia’s Area Planning and Development Commission,
by John Tracy (A report presented to Prof. A. J. Contanese in
partial requirement for City Planning Course #606, Georgia
Institute of Technology, Spring Quarter, 1972)
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The total employment increased 6.1% between
1960—1970 while agricultural employment declined
from 8,422 to 5,489. Manufacturing employment
between 1960 and 1971 increased over 52%, and un
employment in the area declined. The rate in
1960 was 4.8% and in 1970 was only 3.6%.
Income also increased:
1960 1970
Medium Family Income $2,923 $5,990
Per Capita Income 1,033 1,920
Even though the number employed in agriculture
declined, major improvements occurred in farm
income. Between 1964 and 1969 total farm income
grew from $44.6 million in 1964 to $75.5 million
in 1969, an increase in total receipts of 193%.
Retail sales between 1967 and 1971 were up 57%.
Total receipts in the service trades were up 27.5%
(this category includes tourism and industry es
tablishments) 6
More analysis is needed to determine precisely how the
specific activities of Slash Pine represents their interpre
tation of the mission of regionalism. However, the extensive
field interview with the Executive Director of Slash Pine
leads me to conclude that this APDC perceives its mission in
a planning and coordinating fashion to facilitate economic
growth in each of the local subdivisions of government. Like
ARC, the Slash Pine APDC does not view its mission in terms
of planning and development for one undifferentiated
6HTlie Impact of the New Federalism of City Planning,”
by Frank S. Sch, Planning: The ASPO Magazine, May, 1973.
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geographic and population concern, to be planned for within
such a context; nor is it viewed as an administrator of
regional programs. However, unlike ARC, Slash Pine is a
rural APDC devoid of the urban/rural dichotomy. The influ
ence among the majority of the local units of governments is
more diffuse.
Lastly, more unlike both ARC and Slash Pine, the
Georgia Mountain APOC sees its mission as one going beyond
the planning and coordination functions for the local govern
mental units. It views regional program implementation as an
integral part of its planning and coordination functions.
Socio—econOmic growth for the region is seen in terms of
regional planning and regional program implementation under
the auspices of the APDC. The Georgia Mountain APOC area is
tremendously underdeveloped and not particularly endowed
with an abundance of natural resources and therefore it seems
that regionalism takes on a different urgency here. Effici
ency, economy, coordination are seen as a prerequisite for
regional socio—economic growth.
The Georgia Mountain APDC performs the regular
legislative mandated programs of planning, coordination and
review for its member local units of governments. It has
also taken the initiative in implementing regional service
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type programs through its own executive and administrative








——management assistance to local government
——recreation
Most of the other APDC’s sponsor similar type pro
grams, but the difference is that they are more local in
scope. By and large, these programs are sponsored by local
government agencies, and in some cases by private ones.
This arrangement does not appear to be the case with the
Georgia Mountain APDC, and one can reasonably deduce this
fact from the data in Figure 5. Particular attention should
be given to its staff and budget sizes. Georgia Mountain
has one hundred and forty—seven staff members and a budget
of $3,422,229. The staff is nearly twice as large as that
of ARC, which has eighty-five, and its budget is nearly a
half million dollars larger than ARC’s. A logical explanation
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for the large staff and budget can be deduced from Georgia
Mountain’s perception of its mission as a regional operating
agency.
It appears that the Georgia Mountain APDC comes the
closest to a regional governmental prototype than any other
APDC. One additional observation is the fact that Georgia
Mountain has the largest number of elected officials, twenty—
one, serving on its Board of Directors, as compared to the
other APDC’s. It also has the largest percentage of elected
officials compared to its total board composition. These
points are being raised to suggest that the Georgia Mountain
APDC’s perception of its operational role is apparently en
dorsed by the local governmental units comprising its organi
zational structure. Either the board of directors has formu
lated these policies themselves, or has endorsed them.
Additional research is needed here for a more precise
understanding of this particular situation and the many fac
tors determining the development of this phenomenon. Perhaps
of equal importance would be a comparative analysis between
the Georgia Mountain APDC and the North Georgia APOC, or the
Northeast Georgia APDC, two other regions with similar socio
economic and general demographic characteristics, to deter
mine the reasons for the differences in their particular
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growth patterns. However, for the purpose of this study,
the delineation of those characteristics of the Georgia
Mountain APDC, underscoring its functional dissimilarities
relative to the other APDC’s, is sufficient.
Having offered a general history of regionalism in
the United States and the evolutionary trends of federal
intervention in public policy reformation; the legislative
chronology of regionalism in Georgia and an overall descrip
tion of the Georgia APDC’s, along with the three functional
typologies, it would appear that sufficient background is
available to proceed with a discussion of Chapter VI, “The
Future of Georgia APDCs and Regionalism in General.”
CHAPTER VI
THE FUTURE: THE GEORGIA APDC AND
NATIONAL REGIONALISM
Thus far in our examination of substate multi—
jurisdictional regionalism in the state of Georgia, we are
able to delineate three important determinants of their
growth and development, the federal public sector, the Gen
eral Assembly, and the state and local governments. We have
seen the interdependent and sensitive nature of the APDC
functional responsibilities but at the same time we have seen
what appears as their progressive growth and a more definite
determination of their functional character. Continued sup
port by these factors can cause one to suggest reasonable
optimism for the future of the Georgia APDC’s and regionalism
in general. Nevertheless, although these factors are neces
sary for the survival of regionalism in the U.S., they are
not sufficient. This chapter will review the impact that
federal, state and local governments have had on regional
planning and development reformation thus far, and will
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suggest additional alliances which must be formed to solidify
their existence.
The fact that substate multi-jurisdictional region
alism in Georgia was an initiative of the General Assembly,
suggest a commitment on its part for this form of reformation
program. Also, the willingness to conform to federal public
sector requirements seems to further suggest its willingness
to enter into an alliance with the national level of govern
ment for the further assurance of the success of regional
reformation. Later, when we review the federal public
sector’s contribution to regionalism we shall discuss sub—
state planning and development in Georgia as a form of the
national planning and development effort, implying that
regionalism at the state and local level is contingent on
its success at the national level.
State support for substate regional is important and
its future is contingent on the degree of commitment from
state governments. A 1969 report prepared by the Economic
Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, in
dicates that the states do perceive a definite value in sub—
state multi—jurisdictional regionalism over and above the
federal financial incentive:
--Meeting Federal requirements by fulfilling the
requirements of many Federal programs that
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comprehensive planning be carried out on a
multicounty basis, or that a planning area be
defined as a pre condition to financial support.
-—Delineation and standardization of geographic
boundaries by (1) establishing planning jurisdic
tions suited to the scale of areawide problems,
planning activities of state agencies and as the
focus of planning by regional agencies (2) co
ordinating Federally sponsored and/or operated
programs at substate levels within the state, and
(3) creation of common areas for collecting and
analyzing information and statistics.
——Coordination and implementation of State, Federal,
and local planning and development - including
physical, economic, health, and welfare — on an
areawide basis.
—-Strengthening of county and municipal government
by interrelating appropriate rural and urban con
cerns, and providing a mechanism for cooperative
decision making and action.
——Provision of services on a regional basis.
——Promoting Federal assistance by assisting local
governments and private organizations in obtaining
Federal grants and loans.
—-Coordinating administration of State agencies, by
using a regional framework and the focus of plan
ning by regional agencies to help establish priori
ties, and to minimize overlap, duplication, and
competition in state planning and programming
activities.
-—Planning by district organizations through the
identification of problems, goals and opportunities
and through the integration of state and local
development policies and goals at the regional
level.
—-Planning by State or Federal agencies for coordi
nating major state plans and Federal programs on
the regional scale.
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——Promoting economic development through multicounty
planning and development organizations.
——Achieving economies by focusing resources available
for development (leadership, manpower and money) —
an objective especially important in rural areas.’
Another survey, conducted in May 1970 by the National
Governors’ Conference, the Economic Development Administra
tion, and the Office of Management and Budget, provides addi
tional information relative to state governments and their
views on substate multi—jurisdictional regionalism. The
purpose of the survey was to ascertain, in a ranking order,
a determination of the states’ assessment of these substate
agencies. Out of the fifty states, responses were received
from thirty. The first preference of all the states was the
category of “planning” with 16 states giving it a first
priority ranking. The second, “development,” received 12
first and second priority ranking, and the third, “standard
ization of boundaries for local and/or federally supported
organizations,” won 16 first through third priority rankings.
The fourth preference of all the states was the category,
“state administration of functional agencies,” with 10 first
through fourth priority rankings; and the fifth category,
‘The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela
tions, “Statewide Systems of Substate Districts,” Volume I,
October 1973, Washington, D. C., Chapter III.
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“government service districts,” had nine first through fifth
priority rankings.2 (See Figure 6.)
If these surveys, as well as others, are reasonably
accurate assessments of the state and local government rea
sons for their involvement in multi—jurisdictional region
alism, then one can deduce further optimism for their future.
Without the states’ support and active encouragement of the
development of regionalism, this reformation program would
definitely be short lived.
Local government support for the APOC’s was an addi
tional factor contributing to their growth and development.
Without the passage of the local government ordinances and
the active involvement of local APDC programs, functional
substate regionalism in Georgia would definitely have been
obstructed. So far the APDC’s have been able to satisfy the
competitive interests of its many local governmental units,
but the logical extension of regionalism at the local levels
of government has not yet manifested itself. As long as the
APDC’s, at least the majority of them, continue to emphasize
their planning and coordination functions and continue to









State Admin— For Local and
istrationof Provision or Federally
Functional of Supported
Planning Development Agencies Services Organizations Other
Ranking by States
First Priority 16 3 2 3 2
Second Priority 6 9 3 5 1
Third Priority 1 2 4 1 8
Fourth Priority 1 4 4 1
Fifth Priority 1 3 1 1
Priority Not Differentiated 5 4 3 2 3
Subtotal 28 20 16 11 21 3
No Purpose Recognized 2 10 14 19 9 27
Total States Reporting 30 30 30 30 30 30
Cumulative Rankings
First Priority 16 3 2 3 2
First and Second Priority 22 12 2 3 8 3
First thru Third Priorities 23 14 6 4 16 3
First thru Fourth Priorities 23 15 10 8 17 3
First thru Fifth Priorities 23 16 13 9 18 3
Total Mentions 28 21 16 11 20 3
Sample questionnaires returned on the May 1970 Substate District Survey,”
conducted by the National Governors Conference, the Economic
Development Administration, and the Office of Management and
Budget.
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and as long as they are able to suppress their roles as
regional executors of planned coordinated programs, support
from their local government member units will more than
likely be forthcoming.
On a whole, most of the Georgia’s APDC’s have per
formed invaluable management services to local governments.
However, to suggest that because they were able to perform
this function well, local governments will accept them as
more viable and meaningful governmental structures would not
necessarily follow logically. The converse may tend to
appear more logical. The fact that local government’s manage
ment capabilities were improved would tend to cause a greater
reluctance on the part of local government to subscribe to
consolidation, or regional governments. However proficient
or efficient local government management becomes, by itself,
it will not necessarily determine the economic viability of
the local community’s economy.
APOC’s are rendering a valuable service by providing
management assistance to local governments. By helping to
improve the capabilities of public officials, the APDC’s may
be contributing to a pool of efficiency that could be tapped
in the future to function in a different kind of local
governmental system. Simply creating a greater awareness
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for more management efficiency in local government could
have immediate direct and long term indirect implications
for them and their constituents. Admittedly, the management
service rendered by APDC’s offers a relatively weak case for
their existence and for regional government in general, but
nonetheless it is a positive contribution and somewhat valid
reason for their existence.
A stronger case for the existence of the APDC’s is
their regional planning, development and coordination func
tion. In this capacity, the APDC’s have the opportunity to
advance an economic or social service proposition that can
demonstrate the case for a more viable economic approach and
the possibility for more and better services. They can
juxtapose their regional plans, showing potential benefits,
with those of parochial governments and argue their case very
rationally.
There are those who, although strongly supportive of
regionalism, are pessimistic about its future. They see a
questionable future for comprehensive planning and develop
ment unless these regional bodies can become regional auth
orities with the power to implement programs within these
redrawn geographical jurisdictions.
The history of American regionalism indicates that
both federal and state partners have frequently found
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it necessary to create multi—state mechanisms to deal
with regional problems. Yet regionalism has, for the
most part, been approached on an ad hoc basis. This
is of course to be expected, given the political base
for regional governmental agencies and instrumentalities.
Thus, regionalism presents a dilemma for the American
federal system. For on the one hand, there are definite
regional phenomena that demand the formulation of suitable
multi—state, broad—based, authoritative character of
federal and state governments. Regionalism remains
current due to the multiplicity of regional problems
encountered in life; it also remains a delicate task to
fit regional institutions into a political system that
is not organized along regional lines.3
Most regional planning commissions are political
bastards, the offspring of a loveless alliance between
cynics and dreamers, with no general government will
ing to acknowledge more than a foster parent relation
ship.4
Planning divorced from political implementation was
once merely an occasion for derision; today it should
be cause for restructuring our decision—making process.5
By far the most dominant determinant of substate
multi-jurisdictional regionalism and regional reformation
programming in general is the federal public sector. In
Chapter III we have seen the federal government increasing
its financial support to multi-jurisdictional regionalism,
3”me Need for Cooperation Between APDC5,” by Carrol
Underwood (a keynote address presented at a conference for
APDC Executive Directors), 1970.
4”Notes APDC Policy Conference,” sponsored by the
Georgia Regional Executive Directors Association and the
Institute of Community and Area Development, Act 26—27, 1970,
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
5Richard F. Babcock, “Let’s Stop Romancing Region
alism,” Planning: The ASPO Magazine, 1973.
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as well as increasing its requirements for planning and co
ordination of these public resources. As a result of the
state and local compliances, federal aid to them quadrupled
between 1952 and 1964 and is expected to increase another
fifty percent in 1967.6 In 1968 total federal support to
state and local governments amounted to $17.5 billion. In
1972 federal funding for area—wide programs to state and
local multi—jurisdictional agencies amounted to $8.62
7
billion.
More important to the future of substate regionalism
in Georgia is the future of regionalism in the U.S. in gen
eral. Substate regionalism is part and parcel of a national
reformation effort.
Bertram Gross and James O’Connor state that public
sector reformation is moving towards a managed society.
Gross in his essay “Friendly Fascism: A Model for America,”
argues the trends in post—industrial societies all point to
an administrative system that would seek to manage the total
6Comission on Economic Development, Modernizing
Local Government (New York: The Committee, July 1966)
7Michael Stone and Parris Glendening, “State and
Local Expenditures: Who Gets the Budget?” in Controversies
of State and Local Political Systems, ed. Mavis Many Reeves
and Parris N. Glendening (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.,
1972), p. 257.
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society. Monopoly capitalism in the present stage of its
development warrants such an arrangement to pursue its
capital accumulation interest. Public service sector activ
ities are being viewed as a possible frontier for exploita
tion. However, to achieve this objective the society itself
must be arranged in an efficient fashion. Just as interna
tional monopoly capitalism requires substantial decentrali
zation, dispersion and devolution, so does the society.
These are prerequisites for truly large scale management.
The U.S. government must be viewed as “big business” and
managed in that fashion. Decentralization is necessary
because detail control prevents, or interferes with compre
hensive control. This notion certainly implies the retention
of power of course, just as regionalism and its revenue
sharing component suggest. Regionalism in the U.S. appears
to be an attempt to manage a macrosystem with a multiple
hierarchy, “polyarchic” forms of shared and diffused respon
sibilities
8
Gross refers to the evolving U.S. capitalist society
as a warfare—welfare—industrial—communication—police complex.
8Bertram Gross, “Friendly Fascism: A Model for Amer
ica,” in Is America Possible? Social Problems From Conserva
tive, Liberal and Socialist Perspectives edited by Henry
Etzbowitz (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1974),
pp. 440—42.
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James O’Connor in Fiscal Crisis of the State refers to the
U.S. society in similar terms, the social industrial complex.
Both concepts imply the use of monopoiy capital techniques
to organize and manage the public sector’s social functions
and to transfer as much of public sector’s social functions
to the monopoiy capital sector for its management and for
its further pursuance of its capital accumulation objective.
Already the monopoly capital sector is making advances in
the area of energy—conservation, environmental pollution and
public education. Further advances for the social industrial
complex are contingent on the profitability of these activ
ities and its need to control the managed society.9
O’Connor suggests that monopoly capital support for
regionalism derives from their perception of the nature of
the fiscal and social dilemma at the state and local levels
of governments:
For local politicians and businessmen the problem
is that funds are not available in sufficient quanti
ties when and where they are needed by local government
and local capital. Until recently, federal grant pro
grams actually redistributed revenues from the indus
trial to the nonindustrial states and from the larger
states where the fiscal crisis was most severe to the
smaller states. However, for the monopoly capitalist
9jaxnes O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State
(London: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 51—58.
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and the federal executive the problem is that too many
projects established under the auspices of too many
governe5 and special districts receive too many funds.
Concerned less with the fiscal crisj5 in particular
states and cities and more with the fiscal crisis as a
Whole, corporate Planners and the federal governe are
preoccupied with the many tmajor administrative diffi
culties’ created by the ‘rapid, Uncoordinated piecemeal
expansjo of the Federal grant syste’ In short,
national planners are worried chiefly about efficiency_
meaning, ultimately corporate Profitability and accumu
lation. As the CED puts it, ‘home rule for those who
can handle it.’ at this means is that ‘big business
is Uniting behind Plans to set up region administra
tive govern5 that usurp present local governm
Powers (taxation, Zoning, Policing, eminent domain) in
order to make domestic economic expansion more efficient
and centrally Planned.’ Other capitalist agenci5 such
as the National Industrial Conference Board have developed
ideas for regjofl fiscal Planning, which, in turn, will
Ultimately require region governme new Political
structures through which Federal funds will be channeled.
In brief, revenue_sharing programs developed by big
business boil down to new Policies to reduce or eliminate
the Power of local government and Substitute region
Planning and region governm organiz by monopoly
capital .10
Further on this subject, O’Connor offers the more liberal
view of the monopoly capitalists represented by comments
made by David Rockefeller in the Wallstreetjou
rn; Decem
ber 21, 1971:
The ultimate scope and limits of capitalist reform
depend on the ongoing Political struggles and movements
that shape the Social_industri
al complex Monopoly
capital strives to define and control the complex in
terms of its own perceived interests. David Rockefeller
10Ibid., PP. 212-14
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writes, ‘In view of the emerging demands for revision of
the social contract, a passive response on the part of
the business community could be dangerous. Any adaption
of our system to the changing environment is far more
likely to be workable if those who understand the sys
tem’s problems share in designing the solutions. So it
is up to businessmen to make common cause with other
reformers. . . to prevent the unwise adoption of extreme
and emotional remedies, but on the contrary to initiate
necessary reforms that will make it possible for business
to continue to function in a new climate.’
Summing up the corporate liberal view, Rockefeller
continues, ‘now with the social contract again up for
revision, new social and environmental problems are
generating increasing pressure for further modification
and regulation of business. By acting promptly, busi
ness can assure itself a voice in deciding the form and
content of the new social contract.
Corporate liberals seek a ‘new social contract, ‘ one
that involves governmental decentralization and regional—
ization and the meshing of private corporate management
‘inventiveness’ with the sovereign power of the state.
To achieve ‘responsible decentralization, ‘ they would
establish ‘local control fronts.’ . . non—profit com
munity corporations linked to regional-planning
agencies through which federal funds would be channeled
from the state treasury to private corporations engaged
in social—industrial investment. More and more, the
issue of the growth of the social—industrial complex and
regional planning are inseparable. And because regional
planning requires corporate—dominated regional govern
ment, whether the fiscal crisis will be ameliorated by
the complex depends on whether large—scale capital and
the federal executive can persuade local government to
cooperate or force it to submit.11
The fact that the federal public sector has an
interest in regionalism, as well as an influential element
11lbid., pp. 226—27.
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of the corporate sector increases the level of optimism for
regionalism. However, as aforestated, the logical expression
of regionalism is regional governments, and this manifesta
tion is not without its deterrents.
This form of governmental structural transformation
will certainly receive opposition from forces in society
wedded to American tradition, who would view any departure
from tradition as un—American. Regional government pursued
directly would be nipped in the bud by these forces. This
certainly is not the case so far. The approach is indirect,
surruptitious. It would seem reasonable for one to conclude
that the present forces at work in favor of regionalism can
certainly prevail in time, with no other factors entering
the picture. Also, social gains would tend to weaken the
hold of tradition.
O’Connor implies that the public sector and monopoly
capital must accommodate several other factors before regional
government can become a reality. The competitive capitalist
sector would adamantly oppose the creation of regional govern
ments because this would mean the relinquishing of their main
power bases which is locused in the state and local govern
ments and in the states’ congressional delegations. This
opposition could present a serious obstacle for the executive
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branch and monopoly capital and the future prospects for
regionalism. A compromise will have to be found.
Organized labor is opposed or indifferent to regional
government, especially those in the competitive capitalist
sector. Those in the monopoly capitalist sector will also
oppose regional government and its corporate social program
ming. This will mean more taxes for social programs. Also,
organized labor is in constant fear of losing its collective
bargaining gains made since World War II. Any change in the
status quo or suggestion of change will provoke paranoic re
action.
Neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties can
afford to openly support regional governments. The Democra
tic Party would lose its organized labor support if it did
and certainly lose its tremendous congressional dominance.
The Republican Party would lose its competitive capitalist
support, the chambers of commerce, and the small business.
Again, the executive branch of government and the monopoly
capital sector must find a way to at least accommodate the
interests of one of these political parties, or find a new
one.
Blacks and other ethnic minorities are apprehensive
about regionalism, mainly because they perceive it portending
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diffusing of population and electoral densities. A close
examination of the Black population geographic distribution
in the state of Georgia would dispel this apprehension, at
least for this state.
By referring to appendixes B through J the reader
will see, shown graphically, illustrations describing the
general population distribution by county and by APDC; and
a Black/white ratio distribution by county and by A?DC.
From these illustrations one can deduce the following:
First — that the majority of Blacks in Georgia do
not live in Black majority counties but
rather in the 30% and 40% Black counties.
Second - that only 9% of the Black population, or
108,263 Blacks, live in Black majority
counties.
Third - that the majority of Blacks live in the 30%
and 40% Black APDC’s (as a matter of fact,
these illustrations show that 59% of the
Black population live in the 30% and 40%
Black majority APOC’s, while only 58% live
in the 30% and 40% Black counties — and that
there are more Blacks living in the 40%
Black APDC’s than Blacks living in the 40%
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Black counties, 33% versus slightly over
—‘Ic.
Furthermore, as the illustrations in these appendixes
indicates, the only exception to these conclusions, which
slightly favor the APDC’s, is the Atlanta Regional Commission.
The cumulative average Black percentage in six counties in
ARC is 9.1%, and the seventh alone (Fulton County) it is
39.3%. Diffusion does take place in ARC. ARC has a less
than 20% Black population, while 30% of the total Black
Georgia population live there.
However, these data do dispel to a significant degree
the Black apprehensiveness about regionalism and its diffu
sion tendencies. More importantly, the data suggest the
potential significance the Black vote could have, used to
advocate in behalf of regionalism. A united Black electo
rate, allied to the federal and the private corporate sec
tors could potentially bring regional government closer to a
reality in Georgia, at least in those 30% and 40% Black
APDC’s. Granted, the foregone statement can be classified as
an irresponsible speculative theory, but the real point to be
made is that the Black electorate has no less leverage in an
APDC governmental arrangement than in the county governmental
arrangement, except for the Black majority counties. Also,
87
that an over—reliance or over—involvement in traditional
electoral politics in the absence of any consideration for
other possible trends in electoral politics may work to the
future disadvantage of Blacks, especially if this new
societal order becomes more and more of a reality.
In summary, these forces at work in support of sub—
state multi—jurisdictional regionalism in Georgia, seem suf
ficient enough to suggest an optimistic future for it. These
local and state factors have thus far only given their par
tial support, coming just short of support for the natural
and logical expression of regionalism, regional governments.
These local factors seen as a part of a national, public and
private effort at regionalism further enhance this optimism.
The federal public sector and the private corporate
sector support for regionalism appear to be gaining in momen
tum. A veritable marriage seemed to also have been consum
mated between these two sectors, with regional government
being tauted as the champion of the “American post—
industrialized way.”
It is evident that a selling job is still needed to




This study has concerned itself with social program
ming in the United States, focusing on regionalism, and more
specifically substate multi-jurisdictional regionalism in
the state of Georgia. As was stated early in the study,
regionalism as a social reformation policy and program seems
to hold the greater currency as a reform effort and seems to
have the most extensive support base at the present time.
Focusing on the Georgia APDC’s and identifying their activ
ities within the context of the national effort at regional
planning and development helps to understand the totality of
the regional effort as well as the main determinant forces
presently involved in this effort and those necessary alli
ances which still must be formed before regionalism can
continue towards its natural, logical conclusion, regional
governments.
Social crises are societal conditions which cannot be
taken lightly. The public sector, in its role as a
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legitimizing agent, must provide the prescriptive measures
to ameliorate these concerns. Or, it must at least give the
impression that these concerns are being ameliorated. Crit
ical social conditions can be a cause for the disruption of
a society.
The public sectors have long ago established the
necessity and its right to address social difficulties.
First, state and local governments played the dominant role
in this area, but since the l93Os the federal government
has assumed dominance. Until recently the federal government
proceeded to address these social service demands through its
categorical grant-in—aid programs. These are no longer ade
quate and the federal public sector has had to embark on a
new reformation course. The new federal reform strategy
appears to have centralizing hierarchical characteristics,
with sufficient diffusion to be appealing. Superficially,
the new strategy emphasizes decentralization of public re
source expenditures to satisfy state and local social ser
vice demands, but centralized or comprehensive control remain
in fact at the federal level. Federal level control is mani
fested through its determination of programmatic expenditure
areas and its monitoring function. Local control is
mystified.
90
The fact that regionalism suggests more local control
than it really extends, does not necessarily mean it has a
very dim future. Mystified conviction serves the same pur
pose as rational conviction. It is conviction still the
same. The trends do point to the coming of the age of re
gionalism, regional governments. Even if it does become a
reality, a question will still remain imminent. How long
can social conflicts be ameliorated through social reform
programs, if indeed the dilemma is more accurately defined
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Atlanta Regional Commission Staff
Central Savannah River APDC Staff
Georgia Mountains APDC Staff
Middle Georgia Planning Commission Staff
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Slash Pine APDC Staff
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503
July 24, 1969
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET CIRCUlAR NO. A-95
WHAT IT IS--HOW IT WORKS
This Bureau of the Budget Circular was developed as a
means, in part, of implementing the Intergovernmental Cooper
ation Act of 1968, particularly section 201 and Title IV.
Title IV, among other things, directs the President to
“establish rules and regulations governing the formulation,
evaluation, and review of Federal programs and projects having
a significant impact on area and community development.” The
basic objectives of this mandate center about the importance
of sound and orderly development of urban and rural areas on
the economic and social development of the Nation. Section
401(b) of the Act requires that “all viewpoints——national,
state, regional, and local-—shall, to the extent possible, be
taken into account in planning Federal or federally assisted
development programs and projects.” Section 401 (c) states,
moreover, that “to the maximum extent possible, consistent
with national objectives, all Federal aid for development
purposed shall be consistent with and further the objectives
of State, regional and local planning.”
Section 201 of the Act requires Federal agencies
administering grant—in—aid programs to supply the Governor
and legislature of any State, grants—in—aid made in that
State.
The Circular incorporates two existing broad Govern
ment—wide planning requirements in furtherance of Title IV:
——Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metro
politan Development Act of 1966, which requires that applica
tions for Federal assistance to a wide variety of public
facilities type projects (highways, hospitals, etc.) in
metropolitan areas must be accompanied by the comments of an
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Continued, Page 2 July 24, 1969
areawide comprehensiv Planning agency as to the relationshIP
Of the proposed project to the Planned develo
p Of the
area. The flew regu1tj03 Under this Circular Which will
Supersede Circular No. A—82 on October 1, 1969, build upon
the review process estlished under section 2Q4
-Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-So which en
courages region Planning on a consistent geograp base
of State_establ
ished regions Federal progr5 assisting
Pl&flfling and develop are regui to conform to these
regions unless there is clear JUstification for not doing
so. The regu1tj0 also reguj5 that applicants for Federal
assistance to regional Planning and develo
p
identify
related Planning and develo
p
activities in the region
With them.
and demonstrate how they will coordinate their o activities
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APPENDIX C
PROFILE OF EIGHT OF THE GEORGIA APDCs
1. Central Savannah River APDC (Augusta, Georgia)
1970 Population — 350,000
Legal Basis - Interlocal Agreement Act
Area Encompassed — Burke, Columbus, Emmanuel, Glascock,
Jefferson, Jenkins, Lincoln, McDuffie, Richmond,
Taliaferro, Warren, Wilkes and Screven Counties.
Number of Members - 13 counties, 16 towns
SMSA Morethan
Breakdown of Representatives — 30% elected; variable
Voting System Each unit, two votes; for at large
from total area
Staff Total 16; professional 9




Financial Sources Local 25%; state 25%; federal 50%
Federal Programs HUD, HEW, EDA, DOJ
State Programs Work with Health Department; receiving
funds from State Planning Bureau Law
Enforcement
Other Regional Agencies: None listed
Hot Programs Airport Planning, solid waste disposal,





2. Southwest Georgia APDC (Camilla, Georgia)
1970 Population — 315,000
Legal Basis - Regional Planning Agency Act
Area Encompassed — Baker, Calhoun, Colquitt, Decatur,
Dougherty, Grady, Lee, Miller, Mitchell, Seminole,
Terrell, Thomas and Worth Counties.
Number of Members — 13 counties, 46 cities
SMSA Morethan
Breakdown of Representation - 35% elected; variable
Voting System One county, two votes
Staff Total 25; ten professional
Transportation Planning - No
Responsibility
204 Agency No
Total Budget $269,266; up $63,045
Financial Sources Local, 32%; state, 17%; federal, 51%
Federal Programs HUD (701), FHA (a sewer and waste
planning), FDA, DOJ (law enforcement)
State Programs Industrial development, SMSA transpor
tation plan, crime control planning;
works with planning bureau, Department
of Industry and Trade, Highways, Parks,
Health and Labor.
Other Regional Agencies - Southwest Georgia Comunity
Action Council; several multi—county
health organizations, regional libraries,
public health, forestry protection units,
watershed group, soil conservation dis
tricts.
Law enforcement
Local planning assistance, industrial
development, crime, sewer and water.
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3. Lower Chattahoochee Valley APDC 9 Columbus, Georgia)
Legal Basis - Regional Planning Agency Act
1970 Population — 240,000
Area Encompassed — Muscogee, Chattahoochee, Stewart, Clay,
Quitman, Randolph and Early Counties.
Number of Members 7 counties
Breakdown of Representation - 70% elected; variable
Voting System Each county, two votes
Staff Total 9; professional 5




Total Budget $86,756; up $38,250
Financial Sources Local, 25%; state, 40%; federal, 35%
Federal Programs EDA; DOJ
State Programs Works with State Planning Bureau,
Department of Parks, Department of
Industry and Trade.
Other Regional Agencies — Chattahoochee Valley Council of
Governments
Hot Programs Airport planning, law enforcement,
housing
Principal Program EDA, criminal justice, housing
incentory
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4. Chattahoochee—Flint APDC (Lagrange, Georgia)
1970 Population — 190,000
Legal Basis — Interlocal Agreement Act
Area Encompassed — Carrol, Coweta, Harris, Head, Men—
wether, Pike, Talbot, Troup, and Upson Counties
Number of Members 9 counties, 9 cities
SMSA No
Breakdown of Representation — Less than 50% elected;
variable
Voting System One vote, one unit
Staff Total 10; professional 7
Transportation Planning Responsibility - No
204 Agency No
EDD Yes
Total Budget $161,000; up$2l,000
Financial Sources Local, 23%; state, 30%; federal, 38%
Federal Programs EDA, Appalacia; Omnibus Crime
State Programs State Planning Bureau; Traffic Plan
ning; State Department of Industry
and Trade; industrial development;
law enforcement; Appalacia
Other Regional Agencies — Community Action for Improvement,
Inc. (OEO)
Hot Programs Law Enforcement
Principal Programs Industrial development, 25%; technical
assistance to local governments, 20%,
mineral resource study, 10%; crime and
delinquency control, 10%
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5. Middle Georgia APDC (Macon, Georgia)
1970 Population — 300,000
Legal Basis - Regional Planning Agency Act
Area Encompassed — Bibb, Crawford, Houston, Jones, Monroe,
Peach, Twiggs Counties
Number of Members, 7 counties, 11 cities
SMSA More than
Breakdown of Representation — 91% elected; fixed
Voting System Not listed
Staff Total 13; professionals 8
Transportation Planning Responsibility - Yes
204 Agency Yes
EDD No
Total Budget None listed
Financial Sources Local, 40%; state, 20%; federal, 40%
Federal Programs HUD, FHA
State Programs State Planning Bureau; crime study
Other Regional Agencies - Georgia Technical Development
Agency
Hot Programs Law enforcement, housing, comprehen
sive health planning
Principal Programs —HUD, FHA, 80%; crime study, 10%; local
assistance, 10%
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6. Cossa Valley APDC (Rome, Georgia)
1970 Population — 370,500
Legal Basis — Regional Planning Agency Act
Area Encompassed — Bartow, Cotoosa, Chatooga, Dade, Floyd,
Gordon, Haralson, Murray, Paulding, Polk, Walker and
Whitfield Counties
Number of Members — 12 counties
SMSA More than
Breakdown of Representation — 21% elected; variable
Voting System One unit, two votes (2 members from
each county)
Staff Total 17; professional 8
Transportation Planning Responsibility - Yes
204 Agency No
EDD No
Total Budget $295,095.77; up $72,381.77
Financial Sources Local, 45%; state, 22%; federal, 33%
Federal Programs Appalachia, HUD (701), FHA (water &
sewer), EDA (project study)
State Progranis Highway Department; comprehensive
transportation studies; State Planning
Bureau; regional airport planning
Other Regional Agencies — Northwest Georgia Regional
Health Advisory Council
7. Chattanooga Area Regional Council of Governments:
Tallanooga on northwest Georgia Community Action Agencies
Hot Programs Airport, solid waste, law enforcement,
housing and health
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Principal Programs — Local planning advisory services,
35%; 701 local planning assistance
projects, 15%; FHA water and sewer,
15%; law enforcement, 5%; Appalachia
Project Planning, 5%
8. Slash Pine APDC (Waycross, Georgia)
1970 Population — 119,200
Legal Basis - Regional Planning Agency Act
Area Encompassed — Atkinson, Bacon, Ben Hill, Brantley,
Charlton, Clinch, Coffee, Pierce, and Ware Counties
Number of Members — 9 counties, 9 cities
SMSA No
Breakdown of Representation — 11% elected; variable
Voting System Each unit, one vote
Staff Total 14; professional 7
Transportation Planning Responsibility - Yes
204 Agency No
EDO Yes
Total Budget $276,045; up $84,045
Financial Sources Local, 20%; state, 26%; federal, 54%
Federal Programs EDA, HUD, FHA
State Programs Highway Department; Slash Pine Re
gional Transportation Study. Works
with State Planning Bureau, State
Recreation Commission and State Parks
Department
Other Regional Agencies - None
Hot Programs Airport planning, law enforcement
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Principal Programs — Local Planning Assistance, 40%7
industrial development, 15%; tourism
development, 15%; regional physical




Total population by county, total Black population, per
cent Black population; aggregate APDC population and aggre
gate Black population and cumulative Black population.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: general population char
acteristics, 1970 Census of Population
Total *percent
Total Black (%) Black
Coosa Valley Population Population Population
Dade 9,910 107 1.1
Catoosa 28,271 327 1.2
Walker 50,691 2,395 4.7
Chattooga 20,541 1,982 9.6
Floyd 73,742 9,605 13.0
Polk 29,656 4,663 15.7
Haralson 15,927 1,215 7.6
Paulding 17,520 1,318 7.5
Bartow 32,663 4,181 12.8
Gordon 23,570 1,222 5.2
302,491 27,015 8.9
North Georgia
W1-iitfield 55,108 2,133 3.9
Murray 12,986 69 0.5
Fannin 13,357 29 0.2
Gilmer 8,956 28 0.3






















Harris 11,520 5,185 45.0
Talbot 6,625 4,495 67.8
Muscogee 167,377 42,945 25.7
Chattahoochee 25,813 4,490 17.4
Stewart 6,511 4,196 64.4
Quitman 2,180 1,311 60.1
Randolph 8,734 4,869 55.7
Clay 3,636 2,242 61.7
232,396 69,733 30.0
Middle Flint
Taylor 7,865 3,520 44.8
Marion 5,099 2,674 52.4
Macon 12,933 7,892 61.0
Schley 3,097 1,389 44.8
Webster 2,362 1,379 58.4
Sumter 26,931 11,945 44.4
Crisp 18,087 7,284 40.3



































































































Total Black (¾) Black
Population Population Population
Chatham 187,767 63,676 33.9
Liberty 17,569 6,006 34.2
Long 3,746 1,190 31.8
McIntosh 9,190 7,371 80.2
Glynn 50,528 12,464 24.7
Camden 11,334 4,102 36.2
300,305 99,911 33.3
Georgia Mountains
Union 6,811 0 0.0
Towns 4,565 0 0.0
Ra.bun 8,327 68 0.8
Lumpkin 8,728 154 1.8
White 7,742 369 4.8
Habershasn 20,691 1,181 5.7
Stephens 20,331 2,401 11.8
Hart 15,814 3,684 23.3
Franklin 12,784 1,539 12.0
Banks 6,833 374 5.5
Hall 59,405 5,987 10.1
Forsyth 16,928 5 0.1









































































































































































































































































































































































Total Black (¾) Black
Population Population Population
Atkinson 5,879 1,879 32.0
Clinch 6,405 2,032 31.9
Chariton 5,680 1,914 33.7
Brantley 5,940 589 9.9
Pierce 9,281 1,680 18.1
Ware 33,525 7,492 22.3
97,771 22,550 23.1
Chattahoochee Flint
Carroll 44,404 7.395 16.4
Coweta 32,310 10,301 31.9
Heard 5,354 1,228 23.0
Troup 44,466 14,118 31.8
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